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1. The Reform of the Labour Market in Italy: Main Reasons and 
General Framework  
 
Prompted by the main European and international financial institutions, 
and in response to a particular – and in many respects unique – 
institutional and political scenario, the technocratic government led by 
Mario Monti carried forward an impressive reform of the Italian labour 
market just a few months after its appointment.  
This state of affairs gave rise to an array of interventions across all 
economic and social sectors which – albeit long-awaited1 – previous 
administrations have been unable to put in place. Law No. 92 of 28 June 
2012 was preceded by an even more substantial and widely debated 
overhaul of the pension system2 and was intended to amend the 
regulatory framework of the Italian labour market. Once the newly-
installed government took office, and straight from the inaugural address, 
the measure was presented for public opinion as a matter of urgency. In 
                                                 
* Michele Tiraboschi is Full Professor of Labour Law at the University of Modena and 
Reggio Emilia. 
1 See The White Paper on The Labour Market, which was drafted by Marco Biagi on 3 
October 2001 under the Berlusconi Government. Significantly, most of the objectives set 
down by Mr. Monti and the Minister of Labour Elsa Fornero were already outlined by 
Prof Biagi ten years ago. An English version of the document is available in R. Blanpain 
(eds.), White Paper on The Labour Market In Italy, The Quality of European Industrial Relations 
and Changing Industrial Relations, Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations, August 2002.  
2 For an overview of the reform of the pension system in the context of the so-called 
“Decree to Save Italy” see Monti’s £30 billion survival plan, on www.eurofound.europa.eu 
(Last accessed 1 October 2012). 
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discussing the current macro-economic context, the reform of the 
national labour market was portrayed as an inevitable move to secure the 
future of younger generations – most notably in terms of job 
opportunities and pension entitlement – as they have been hit the hardest 
by the crisis that was caused by the collapse of the financial markets3.  
This is consistent with the view – not prevailing, although well-established 
among European commentators and decision-makers – that high 
unemployment rates, chiefly among young people, coupled with the 
steady increase in atypical and precarious employment, have been brought 
about by the high levels of protection for workers in salaried employment. 
An authoritative indication of this line of reasoning is the move made 
during the financial downturn by the President of the European Central 
Bank, Mario Draghi.  
In order to safeguard the future of the youngest generations, Mr. Draghi 
openly questioned the long-term sustainability of the European social 
model. In this sense, he prodded European law-makers into reviewing 
national labour laws, deemed to be unbalanced in favour of adult workers 
(the insiders), particularly in the current recession.  
The Italian Government followed Mr. Draghi’s advice carefully, fuelling a 
polemical discussion concerning the European Central Bank and some 
other European bodies allegedly placing Italy under “special 
administration”. This state of play de facto impinged on the effort – to date 
successful – on the part of both trade unions and pro-labour political 
parties, to counter the decisions made unilaterally by the Government4.  
As will be discussed further, Law No. 92/2012 (hereafter the Monti-
Fornero Reform) has introduced numerous innovative measures. This 
aspect could be observed, as this substantial piece of legislation consists of 
                                                 
3 For an in-depth analysis on the reasons for the reform, particularly to offset the level of 
protection offered to young people against those supplied to their adult counterparts, see 
M. Tiraboschi, Young Workers in Recessionary Times: a Caveat (to Continental Europe) to 
Reconstruct its Labour Law?, in this Journal, 1, No. 1-2, March - June 2012.  
4 At the time of Silvio Berlusconi’s last term in office, trade unions were definitely given 
more room to manoeuvre following the passing of Article 8 of Legislative Decree No. 
138/2012 on the reform of the labour market. Then as now, the Government was 
prompted by the European institutions to take action. It thus empowered collective 
bargaining at company and territorial level to implement certain employment safeguards 
by way of derogation from national bargaining, in order to cope with the crisis and favor 
economic growth. Of course the levels of protection set down by the international 
Conventions, Community legislation, as well as certain limitations concerning labour 
issues imposed upon by the Italian Constitution were still valid. On that occasion, social 
partners succeeded in challenging the measures put forward by the Government. See 
various comments in Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, Giuffrè, 2012 (under Ricerche).  
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270 controversial paragraphs, yet grouped into 4 articles to expedite the 
approval process. For different reasons, the reform was hailed with 
outright hostility by the social partners (see par. 6). Such a reaction 
pressured the Legislator to promptly amend the provision, with a number 
of changes that were already foreseen by the Parliament and took place 
one month after its enforcement5. 
The reform greatly impacted the main aspects of Italian labour law, 
namely the legal procedures to establish and terminate the employment 
relationship. It also deals with the sources of labour law, this is because of 
the preference that has been given to norms of a compulsory character, 
which narrows down the role of trade union law, particularly company 
customs. In addition, social concertation – once pivotal in the evolution 
of labour law in Italy – played a peripheral role while the provision was 
being devised. 
In contrast to what occurred in some other European countries – most 
notably in Spain6 – the reform does not touch upon internal flexibility, 
that is the set of legal provisions governing the employment relationship 
(personnel and job classification, working hours, job description, absence 
from work, and so forth). These aspects – which are clearly of great 
importance – still fall within the province of collective bargaining or are 
subject to mandatory forms of regulation that date back to the 1970s, 
such as Law No. 300/1970 (the Workers’ Statute).  
This approach further upholds the trend towards legal abstentionism in 
labour relations, all the more so if the drafters of the reform also refrain 
from amending the structure and the functioning of collective bargaining7. 
Indeed, the Parliament just delegated to the Government the power to 
deal with issues concerning economic democracy and workers’ 
                                                 
5 See Law No. 134 of 7 August 2012.  
6 Ley No. 3/2012, de 6 de julio, de medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral. For a 
reconstruction of the provisions laid down by the reform of the labour market in Spain, 
see M. L. Martín Hernandez, La última fase de la evolución del derecho del trabajo español: las 
reformas laborales del bienio 2010-2012, in Bollettino Speciale Adapt No. 17, 2012; F. 
Navarro Nieto, Spagna - La riforma del quadro giuridico della contrattazione collettiva, in Diritto 
delle Relazioni Industriali, Giuffrè, No. 3, 2012; A. Baylos, Crisi del diritto del lavoro o diritto del 
lavoro in crisi: la riforma del lavoro spagnola del 2012, Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, Giuffrè, 
No. 2, 2012; J. García Viña, Il sistema di relazioni industriali in Spagna dopo la riforma della 
contrattazione collettiva. L’impegno per il contratto d’azienda, Diritto delle Relazioni Industriali, 
Giuffrè No. 1, 2012. 
7 As a result, and in line with the Italian experience, collective agreements in the private 
sector are regarded within the common-law framework still governed by the Civil Code 
of 1942 which, and at least in formal terms, they are binding on the contracting parties 
only if they are members of employers’ associations and trade unions. 
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participation. Drawing on the German model of co-determination 
(Mitbestimmung), and by means of special provisions that introduced certain 
participation schemes, the attempt of Italian law-makers has been to move 
away from the current industrial relations model – which is of a more 
adversarial nature – to a more cooperative and collaborative approach. 
The proposal was met with approval by the most reformist unions (the 
Italian Confederation of Workers’ Union – CISL – and the Union of 
Italian Workers – UIL), whereas both the more antagonist General 
Confederation of Italian Workers (CGIL) – and the most influential 
employers’ associations (e.g. Confindustria) firmly opposed this approach.  
As far as the overall structure of the reform is concerned, the 
Government’s original intentions were to favour more flexibility in hiring 
by way of open-ended contracts which make the dismissal easier – mainly 
for economic reasons – concurrently scaling back the scope of atypical 
and temporary work, either in salaried and quasi-subordinate employment. 
One might note, however, that the give-and-take accompanying the 
approval of the Monti-Fornero Reform and subsequent amendments – 
e.g. Law No. 134/2012 – prejudiced the foregoing plan8.  
In fact, just few weeks after the passing of the reform, a number of 
amendments were made to the provisions on contractual schemes and on 
the remedies put in place in the event of failing to comply with provisions 
regulating dismissals for economic reasons. In some respects, the 
amendments to the reform made it more complicated to conceive the 
overall structure of the proposal put forward by the Government, as well 
as the guiding principles underlying the reform process. 
The same holds for the reform of the labour market safety-net measures, 
which, based on the model of Danish flexicurity, could play a key role in 
enhancing the transition between occupations, as well as leading to a more 
adequate balance between flexibility in hiring and flexibility in dismissals. 
However, a watered-down compromise was eventually reached, since the 
early proposals made by the Minister of Labour to introduce the 
guaranteed minimum wage and, above all, to repeal traditional forms of 
income support were firmly opposed by both social actors and the 
governing parties.  
                                                 
8 In actual terms, such a proposal would concern only large-sized enterprises, for the vast 
majority of small and medium-sized companies in Italy already enjoy higher levels of 
flexibility in dismissals. This is a further explanation of the strong opposition to the 
proposal on the part of several representative associations (artisans and small employers 
in the commercial and tertiary sectors), for it reduces the levels of flexibility in hiring 
without any gains in terms of flexibility in dismissals.  
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The review of the safety-net measures also introduces a number of 
significant amendments (see par. 5), yet representing a case of “old wine 
in a new bottle”. In other words, the provision of unemployment benefits 
funded by social contributions – and not by the general system of 
taxation, as hoped for – is already a well-established practice in Italy. On 
top of that, this system will only be fully implemented in the years to 
come, for its effective sustainability – alongside macroeconomic 
compatibility – will be monitored by the social partners, and dependent 
upon the development of the crisis. 
In an awareness of the foregoing issues, the Legislator outlined the 
reasons and the purposes of the reform, reasserting the central role played 
by full-time open-ended subordinate employment, also with regard to the 
apprenticeship contract, which remains the most widespread contractual 
scheme for those who enter the labour market for the first time. Indeed, 
the preference for this contractual arrangement is not to be ascribed to a 
decrease in the labour costs for open-ended contracts, nor to certain 
simplified procedures which favour their implementation. Rather, there 
has been a concurrent, and in some respects radical, dwindling of the 
regulatory mechanisms and contributions to be borne by employers for 
contractual arrangements in temporary work, self-employment, and quasi-
salaried employment (continuous and coordinated collaboration 
contracts).  
The explicit intention here is to overcome the duality between insiders 
and outsiders – e.g. stable workers and precarious workers – of the Italian 
labour market. Nevertheless, the issue is dealt with in a contradictory 
manner. In fact, the introductory paragraphs of the document clearly state 
that – pending a future and uncertain harmonisation process – the reform 
only concerns the private sector. Accordingly, the public sector does not 
fall within the scope of the provision, primarily because of higher rates of 
trade union representation that ensure protection in terms of stability of 
employment.  
Yet early commentators9 have pointed out another contentious issue, 
which has been acknowledged by the Minister of Labour in a number of 
public statements. The move on the part of the Government aimed at 
narrowing down the use of flexible and atypical work – especially in 
recessionary times – might foster another dualism that is peculiar to the 
Italian labour market, viz. that between regular and irregular employment. 
                                                 
9 See the contributions in M. Magnani, M. Tiraboschi (eds.), La nuova riforma del lavoro – 
Commentario alla legge 28 giugno 2012, n. 92, Giuffrè, 2012. 
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This is particularly the case if one considers the telling arguments put 
forward at an international level10, according to which the extensive 
hidden economy in Italy – amounting to between 23% and 27% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), twice or three times that reported in France 
and Germany – alongside a sound set of safety-net measures11 – now 
called into question (see par. 5) – helped Italy tackle the crisis originated in 
2007 following the economic turmoil. 
The creation of a regular monitoring system to assess the impact of the 
reform on the labour market on the part of the Legislator should be 
deemed of particular significance. The development of a system for 
monitoring purposes should be the domain of the Minister of Labour and 
Social Policies12, who should also oversee the evaluation of the 
implementing stage of the reform programme, its effects in terms of 
efficiency and employability, and the mechanisms for entering and exiting 
the labour market. The results of this monitoring activity might be useful 
to take cognizance of the amendments to be made to the provisions laid 
down by the reform.  
 
 
2. Flexibility in Hiring: the Tightening Up of Atypical and Flexible 
Work and the Revival of Apprenticeships  
 
 
2.1. Fixed-term Contracts 
 
Following the reform of 2001 which implemented the EU Directive No. 
1999/70/CE, Italian legislation allows for the issuing of employment 
contracts of a definite duration, although this must be linked to the 
presence of technical, productive or organisational reasons, even in 
relation to the everyday activity of the employer.  
                                                 
10 See F. Monteforte, The Paradox of Italy’s Informal Economy, Stratfor, August 2012.  
11 For a reconstruction – from a international and comparative perspective – of the 
system of safety-net measures which traditionally consists in a scaling back of working 
hours through various forms of income support, see M. Tiraboschi, S. Spattini, Anti-crisis 
Labour Market Measures and their Effectiveness between Flexibility and Security, in T. Davulis, D. 
Petrylaité (eds.) Labour Regulation in the 21st Century: in Search of Flexibility and Security, 
ADAPT Labour Studies Book-Series, No. 2, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012, 163 
ff. 
12 Article 17 of Legislative Decree No. 276/2003 (the Biagi Reform) already made 
provisions for a careful monitoring system that evaluates the effectiveness of the 
legislative measures put in place. Regretfully, this system was never implemented.  
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Although questioned by a number of case law rulings on matters of fact, 
the aim of the Legislator was to normalise the recourse to fixed-term 
contracts, which up until then could be used only on a temporary basis 
and under special circumstances. 
In an attempt to stress the pivotal role played by open-ended salaried 
employment, the document of the reform states that “full-time open-
ended subordinate employment is the standard form of employment”. In 
the aftermath of the reform, this contractual arrangement was widely 
used, whereas fixed-terms contracts were once again seen as being entered 
into only in certain circumstances, while still regulated by Law No. 
230/1962 and, before that, the Civil Code of 1942.  
With a view to moving beyond this hard-and-fast distinction, the Monti-
Fornero Reform opens the possibility of two additional forms of 
temporary employment.  
In the first case, fixed-term contracts without indicating the justifying 
reason can be issued, that is irrespective of the temporary nature of the 
assignment or the organisational needs of the employer. This employment 
contract can be concluded between an employer (or a user-company) and 
a jobseeker who is hired for the first time and for a limited time up to a 
period of twelve months, in order to perform any kind of task. Unlike the 
past, an employment relationship of this kind can thus be established for 
the first time regardless of the tasks to be carried out by the employee and 
without the obligation upon the employer to provide technical and 
organisational reasons, even in cases of substitute work. The only 
requirement is that the employment relationship lasts for less than twelve 
months.  
Alternatively, the reform specifies that workers can be hired under fixed-
terms contracts for an indefinite period without the need on the part of 
the employer to give details about the reasons for hiring, provided that the 
following conditions are met: 
- this clause must be agreed upon in collective agreements; 
- it must involve not less than 6% of the workers of each production unit; 
- it must be carried out in certain organisational processes (start-ups, the 
launch of new products, technological changes, further stages of a 
research project, renewal or extension of a job assignment). 
It must be said that this route can be pursued only if agreed upon during 
collective bargaining, with the opportunity to resort to this flexible form 
of work in the relevant industry that might be taken into account.  
As far as the first option is concerned, the Legislator appears to run into a 
contradiction. This is because after reasserting the major role played by 
full-time open-ended subordinate employment, a major exception is 
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introduced to this proposition that impinges on the logic of national 
labour law, although limited to the first employment contract that is 
entered into.  
In the second case, and save for a few exceptions, employers’ associations 
will be loath to enter into agreements of this kind, as employers are now 
allowed to wait twelve months before recruiting a worker for the first 
time, also taking account of limitations posed by collective bargaining. In 
addition, the reform reveals a tendency to move away from a decentralised 
industrial relations system which marked earlier provisions at a national 
level. This is because only company-wide and interconfederal (national 
multi-industry) agreements are regarded as valid in this case, with 
decentralisation that takes place in the presence of delegation from 
national collective bargaining.  
The unwillingness to make use of regulated forms of temporary 
employment is further exhibited by another aspect. Starting from 2013, 
the employer who decides to recruit a worker on a fixed-term contract will 
be required to pay an additional contribution amounting to 1.4% of 
pension-qualifying income, in order to finance an occupational fund 
(Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego, see par. 5). Employers will be reimbursed 
this contribution – up to a maximum of the last six months’ pay – 
provided that the employment relationship will be converted into full-time 
open-ended employment, or that the worker will be hired within six 
months of the termination of the limited-term employment relationship. 
Due to the particular nature of this form of employment, this additional 
contribution is not to be paid in the event of workers taken on under 
fixed-term contracts for seasonal and substitute work.  
Still on limited-term employment contracts, further interventions concern 
the continuation of the employment relationship after the expiration of 
the terms, the procedures to dispute its validity, and the forms of 
compensation in the event of transformation into salaried employment.  
With reference to the first point, employees can provide their service for 
the employers up to a maximum of 30 days – and not 20 days as 
previously set – from the date of the expiration of the employment 
contract, if the employment relationship has a duration of less than six 
months. For employment contracts lasting more than six months, this 
threshold has been raised from 30 to 50 days. Contracts which are 
extended longer than these terms will be converted into an open-ended 
employment relationship. 
The Legislator also regulates the interval between fixed-term contracts to 
re-employ the same worker. If the previous employment relationship had 
a duration of less than six months, the lapse of time between the two 
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employment contracts should be of 60 days, and not 10 days, as in the 
past. However, 90 days rather than 20 days should have elapsed between 
one employment contract and the other in cases in which the first 
employment contract lasted more than six months. Nevertheless, 
collective agreements concluded by the most representative trade unions 
and employers’ associations at a national level, are allowed to reduce these 
intervals. More specifically: 
- up to 20 days if the first employment contract has a duration of less than 
six months; 
- up to 30 days if the first employment contract has a duration exceeding 
six months, particularly in the event of hiring resulting from certain 
organisational processes (start-ups, the launch of new products, 
technological changes, further stages of research projects, renewal or 
extension of a job assignment).  
The scaling back of the minimum period between the two employment 
contracts applies for seasonal work and in all cases laid down in collective 
agreements concluded at a national level by the most representative trade 
unions.  
The reform also introduces a statute of limitations for disputing the 
termination of the fixed-term contracts. Workers can appeal against the 
termination that is null and void for reasons related to the date of expiry 
after appraising the employers, also by means of out-of-court procedures, 
within 120 days of the termination of employment, thus raising the 
previous 60-day time limit. After lodging the complaint, workers should 
initiate legal proceedings within the following 180 days and not 270 days 
as originally set down. 
As for employment cases, the law now reviews compensation to be paid 
by the employer in the event of a ruling in favour of the worker and the 
resulting conversion of the fixed-term employment contract into an open-
ended one. Statutorily, the sum to be paid by the employer amounts to 2.5 
to 12 months’ pay, considering the last salary. The novelty lies in the fact 
that this sum of money is now regarded as full compensation for any loss 
suffered by the worker, thus including entitlement in terms of pay and 
social contributions from the termination of the employment contract and 
the decision made by the tribunal. Therefore, following the ruling on the 
part of the courts, the employer – whether or not fulfilling the obligation 
to re-engage the worker – is required to provide arrears of pay and 
relevant contributions. 
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2.2. Temporary Agency Work 
 
The intentions on the part of the Legislator to stress the pivotal role 
played by full-time and open-ended subordinate employment as the most 
widespread form of employment in Italy is patent if one looks at the 
interventions made to the provisions regulating temporary agency work.  
At the outset it should be noted that the proposals laid down seem to be 
insufficient. Most importantly, they show a tendency away from the 
efforts made since 2003 – and in line with international experience – to 
single out agency work as a form of work facilitating the matching of 
supply and demand for labour, especially if compared to atypical and 
temporary employment. 
Within the Italian legal system, agency work was originally regarded as 
particularly useful in organisational and managerial terms, benefitting 
labour flexibility and contributing to the modernisation of the productive 
system. This is also because certain mechanisms of contractual integration 
between undertakings and certain processes – namely staff-leasing, and in-
sourcing, co-sourcing, net-sourcing, selective sourcing, multi-sourcing, 
back-sourcing, co-specialisation and value added outsourcing – to be 
overseen by high-qualified operators within the labour market, as is 
(presumably) the case of work agencies. 
However, the Monti-Fornero Reform puts fixed-term employment on the 
same footing as agency work, thus taking a step back in time of at least 
ten years, as the proposals detailed in the reform programme scale back 
the scope of application of this form of employment. Further, according 
to the reform, the recourse to agency work is possible by providing a 
justifying reason, save for two cases. 
In the first case, the employer and the agency worker can conclude an 
employment contract for the first time and with a maximum duration of 
12 months, without specifying technical, productive, organizational 
reasons, nor whether the worker will be engaged in substitution work, 
which, as a rule, should be included in the particulars of the employment 
contract. It seems worth pointing out that the wording “the very first 
employment relationship between the employer/the user company and 
the employee” used in the text of the reform attempts implicitly, yet in an 
ambiguous manner, to confine this exception to the first employment 
contract entered into, and not to the relationship between the 
employment agency and the worker.  
Alternatively, the conclusion of the employment contract between the 
employer and the agency worker does not require any justification, nor do 
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the contracts have limitations in terms of number and duration, whereas 
the following conditions are met:  
a) this exception is agreed upon during collective bargaining; 
b) it must involve at most 6% of the workers of each production unit; 
c) in the event of hiring resulting from certain organisational processes 
(start-ups, the launch of new products, technological changes, further 
stages of research projects, renewal or extension of a job assignment).  
None of the exceptions allows for an extension of the employment 
contract, once ended.  
In the author’s view, the recourse to agency work devoid of a justifying 
reason might on first approximation facilitate the task of temporary work 
agencies and reduce the rate of employment disputes, particularly if 
compared to that of the previous years. However, in the long- and 
medium-time frame this state of play will debase the role of temporary 
work agencies as qualified operators in the labour market in terms of 
improvement of human capital and specialization of production, limiting 
their function to the mere provision of workers on the basis of the 
employer’s needs.  
The reform also specifies that, for the purposes of calculating the 
maximum duration of fixed-term contracts – in any case not exceeding 36 
months – it is necessary to count towards the time needed to perform the 
same task – e.g. with the same job description – carried out by workers 
with the same qualification. Agency work is thus once again likened to 
fixed-term employment, with this provision that is far from securing 
stable employment. In addition, it acts as a disincentive for the work 
agency, which is therefore loath to provide training and special skills for 
agency workers. As already discussed above, this aspect is further 
confirmation of the marginal role allocated to this form of employment.  
In addition to this, the reform regulates employment agency 
apprenticeships. Employers are still prohibited to hire apprentices on a 
temporary basis. However, it is possible to utilise the services of 
apprentices who are employed by an agency work for an unlimited period 
(staff leasing) in all the productive sectors, that is when a commercial 
contract of an indefinite term between the user company and the 
employment agency is concluded. An obstacle to the implementation of 
this provision might arise from the fact that the reform repealed certain 
norms laid down by the Biagi Reform in 2003. In particular, in compliance 
with European Directive No. 2008/104/CE, the Biagi Law set forth a 
derogation from the principle of equal treatment between agency workers 
and other employees, if the recourse to agency work is made for training 
purposes or aims at easing access to labour market. This aspect might 
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affect the procedures to determine remuneration for apprentices hired by 
the employment agency, as it usually equal to pay for employees of a 
lower grade, or to a certain percentage of remuneration provided to more 
trained and qualified workers.  
Distinct from what was laid down in previous interventions, the Monti-
Fornero Reform also makes provisions for a longer interval between 
fixed-term employment contracts at the time of rehiring the same 
workers. In this connection, the lapse of time to issue a new limited-term 
contract should be of 60 days if the previous employment contract has a 
duration of less than six months, or 90 days for fixed-term contracts 
lasting longer than six months. A literal interpretation of the norm 
suggests that the relationship between the work agency and the worker 
falls outside the scope of application of the provision, while doubts arise 
in reference to the relation between the work agency and the user 
company. Perhaps this can be explained by the attempt on the part of the 
Legislator to prevent the abuse or the repetitive use of fixed-term 
contractual arrangements (“chains” of contracts). Should this be, the work 
agency is either allowed to send the same worker to different user-
companies on a permanent basis, or to the last user-company the worker 
provided his/her services to, for the latter upon compliance with terms of 
renewal statutorily laid down. 
After an inspection of the reform, one might also note a shrinking of the 
funding allocated to employment agencies to promote active labour 
market policies, training, and retraining of temporary workers. In this 
sense, the law provides that starting from 1 January 2013, employers have 
to pay an additional contribution corresponding to 1.4% of pension-
qualifying income for salaried workers hired on a temporary basis. As for 
the employment agencies, this sum is partly offset by a reduction in the 
contribution paid to a training fund for agency workers, that is equal to 
4% of aggregate salary. 
 
 
2.3. Apprenticeship, Access-to-Work Contracts, and Placements 
 
The Monti-Fornero Reform sets much store by the apprenticeship 
contracts, regarded as a privileged channel for helping young people to 
enter the labour market. In the context of this paper, it might be useful to 
point out that a comprehensive reform of apprenticeship already took 
place in September 2011, which included a number of agreements 
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concluded over the two years prior to the reform between the 
Government, the Regions, and the social partners13.  
The reform reasserts the pivotal role carried out by apprenticeship as the 
main contractual arrangement for first-time entrants to the labour market. 
This approach stands in line with the proposal of many academics – 
particularly economists – for a “single employment contract” for people 
starting their first job. One might note, however, that some critical aspects 
of apprenticeship – e.g. the training content – still remain unsolved. 
Accordingly, the widespread use of apprenticeship for first-time entrants 
into the labour market is to be attributed mainly to provisions which 
scaled back the recourse to other contractual schemes for this category of 
workers. This is particularly the case of access-to-work contracts – 
introduced by the Biagi Law in 2003 and now repealed – project work and 
placements.  
In consequence, although welcomed in principle, the proposal of 
apprenticeship as the main contractual scheme to enter the labour market 
is, in general terms, far from being realistic. In fact, nearly one year after 
the enforcement of legislation regulating apprenticeship, the devising of a 
system which considers the needs of productive sectors and the 
differences at regional level has not yet been fully envisaged. The setting-
up of a national system of vocational standards to validate and certify 
one’s vocational skills as laid down by the relevant provisions in 2011 has 
never been implemented either. Therefore, only in formal terms can the 
apprenticeship contracts be classified as full-time open-ended subordinate 
employment and be freely terminated at its end. In practice, it is to be 
considered a fixed-term contract devoid of the training content and not in 
line with the German dual model system to which the Legislator claimed 
to have referred to14 . 
Of significance is the innovation concerning the increase of the number 
of apprentices that can be recruited by the employer, which is determined 
by the number of qualified workers in employment. Starting from 1 
January 2013, the ratio of apprentices – to be hired either directly or 
through open-ended employment agency contracts – to qualified 
employees will be 2 to 3. Notwithstanding specific more favourable 
conditions laid down for the artisan sector, the ratio is set at 1 to 1 for 
employers with less than ten workers, while employers with no qualified 
                                                 
13 See M. Tiraboschi (ed.) Il Testo Unico dell’apprendistato e la nuova disciplina dei tirocini 
formativi, Giuffrè, Milan, 2011.  
14 Supra, par. 3. 
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staff or with less than three specialized workers will be allowed to take on 
up to three apprentices.  
In addition, for the purposes of the reform, employers with at least ten 
employees are allowed to hire apprentices on the condition that they had 
recruited at least 50% of apprentices whose contract ended in the past 36 
months. This percentage has been reduced to 30% in relation to the 36 
months subsequent to the enforcement of the reform. As the provision 
expressly laid down, the employment relationships terminated over the 
probationary period, or due to resignation or just cause dismissal are not 
to be included in the foregoing calculation. Apprentices recruited in 
violation of these conditions are to be considered salaried employees hired 
on open-ended contracts entered into force since the employment 
relationship was established. In the event of non-compliance with this 
ceiling, it is possible to recruit another apprentice who adds to those 
already employed. The same goes in cases in which no apprentice has 
already been hired upon termination of the apprenticeship contract. The 
statutory 50% is a minimum threshold and applies to all productive 
sectors. For this reason, it might be amended upward, depending on the 
applicable collective agreements.  
In order to ensure adequate training, the reform also sets forth that 
apprenticeship contracts should have a minimum duration of 6 months, 
with the sole exception of seasonal work, for which it is only possible to 
issue vocational apprenticeship contracts. 
Also in consideration of the widespread recourse to apprenticeship, the 
Monti-Fornero Reform provides a delegation of certain tasks to the 
Government, also with a view to narrow down the recourse to placements 
and prevent their improper use. This can be done only upon an agreement 
concluded between the parties involved (the State and the Regions) which 
sets down guidelines on training and placements for career guidance 
purposes, to be implemented at regional level. In this connection, the 
reform programme also lays down a number of criteria that foresee more 
stringent rules to regulate this contractual scheme. An example is the 
obligation on the part of employer to provide remuneration to the 
trainees for the work performed.  
 
 
2.4. Part-time and On-call Work  
 
The reform introduces a number of major changes to part-time work 
which concern certain clauses (clausole flessibili ed elastiche) allowing the 
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employer to either modify the time and increase the hours agreed upon in 
the employment contract to perform a given task.  
The conditions and the specifics to carry out the working activity are not 
determined by the employer and the employee directly, but they should be 
set down during collective bargaining.  
In order to encourage the proper use of part-time work as a flexible form 
of employment, the Monti-Fornero Reform specified that it is for 
collective agreements to envisage the procedures enabling workers to 
repeal or amend these clauses. Therefore collective agreements will detail 
the cases in which workers might opt for a review of the employment 
contract in relation to the foregoing clauses. 
Furthermore, the reform also provides the opportunity for some 
categories of workers who already agreed on these clauses to reverse their 
position, most notably working students, workers with oncological 
conditions, and the category of workers listed in collective agreements.  
More radical changes have been made to on-call work (zero-hours 
contracts), that is the employment relationship – either of a definite or 
indefinite duration – in which the workers agree to provide their services 
to the employers, who in turn make use of their performance on the basis 
of what has been laid down by the law or collective agreements. 
The reform made provisions particularly in relation to its scope of 
application. In this sense, it sets forth that – without prejudice to the cases 
specified in the collective agreement – work on an intermittent basis can 
be performed by workers over the age of 55 – thus raising the 44-year-old 
threshold set by the Biagi Law in 2003 – and by workers up to the age of 
24, provided that the tasks are carried out before attaining the age of 25.  
The reform also repeals the clause allowing the carrying out of on-call 
work in certain times of the week, month or year agreed in advance in 
collective bargaining, and sets down some measures to raise the levels of 
transparency.  
More specifically, it places an obligation upon the employer to notify 
relevant authorities (Direzione Territoriale del Lavoro) before the embarking 
on a job task – or a series of job tasks totalling less than 30 days – on the 
part of on-call workers. The notification can be made by text (Short 
Message System), fax, or simply by email. Upon fulfilment of this 
obligation, the employment relationship can be concluded, with the 
employer who is required to notify the relevant authority every time the 
worker is called out to work.  
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2.5. Coordinated and Continuous Collaborations (Quasi-subordinate Employment)  
 
The Monti-Fornero Reform made profound amendments to quasi-
subordinate employment. This is particularly the case with regards to 
project work, that can be loosely defined as an employment relationship 
between the employer and the employee which takes place on a 
coordinated and continuous basis, characterised by an absence of 
subordination relating to the completion of project.  
Unlike what was laid down by the Biagi Law in 2003, the employer is 
relieved from the obligation to provide a work schedule of the project – 
or project phases – to be implemented. As a result, the existence of an 
employment relationship of this kind will only be determined for specific 
projects.  
The project to be carried out needs to be related to a given end result, 
which cannot consist in the mere employer’s company purpose and 
cannot include repetitive tasks.  
The reform clarifies the meaning of the provision laid down in the Biagi 
Law in 2003 according to which professions for which enrolment in 
special registers (albo professionale) is required are excluded for the scope of 
application of project work. It seems important to point out that this 
exception is limited to quasi-salaried employment in the form of 
intellectual work, the nature of which is the same as that performed by 
professionals who need to comply with registration procedures.  
In consequence, professionals who are enrolled in these special registers, 
operate for one client and carry out tasks which are not related to their 
trade will be regarded as engaged in project work. This applies also in 
cases in which professionals operate simultaneously for more than one 
client.  
However, whereas the employment tribunal ascertains that there exists a 
relationship between the work performed and the trade carried out, the 
employment relationship is converted into salaried employment, as a 
project justifying the recourse to project work has not been provided.  
These measures are intended to prevent the fraudulent use of project 
work, particularly to mask salaried employment. One might note, 
however, that this goal has not been achieved through a set of repressive 
measures to combat fraudulent practices, but rather because of the 
unwillingness on the part of employers to make use of project work. This 
is exhibited by an increase in the labour costs for project work – that will 
be the same as that for salaried employment by 2018 – and by the 
provision of more stringent regulations to assess whether project workers 
are hired on salaried employment contracts.  
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The reform also posits that there is a legal presumption in favour of the 
existence of salaried employment without the opportunity to provide 
rebuttal evidence in cases in which the lack of the project to be 
implemented on either formal and substantial levels has been ascertained 
by the courts.  
On the contrary, there shall be a presumption of salaried employment 
with the opportunity to supply rebuttal evidence in cases in which the 
working activity is performed along the same lines of that carried out by 
salaried employees, thus not taken into account tasks which require high 
levels of skills on an exclusive basis.  
As for the termination of the employment relationship, it is still possible 
to discontinue the contract for just cause before it ends, yet pursuant to 
the reform the parties are not allowed to freely terminate the employment 
relationship. The employment contract can be brought to an end by the 
employer only when there is an objective lack of fitness of workers which 
endangers the fulfilment of the project. For their part, workers hired on 
project work contracts can discontinue the employment relationship by 
giving notice, only if this clause is expressly laid down in the contract.  
The reform introduced major amendments also with regard to 
remuneration. Notwithstanding that the amount paid should be 
proportional to the quality and quantity of the work performed, it also 
specified that workers should be remunerated at a rate which is not less 
than the minimum wage set on a sectoral basis. Further, the system of 
remuneration should also consider the employment grading methods set 
up for each sector and taking account minimum wage levels set down for 
similar tasks for salaried employees. Wage setting is agreed upon in 
collective agreements concluded by the most representative trade unions 
and employers’ associations at national, inter-sectoral, and sectoral levels, 
also by means of decentralisation by way of derogation clauses. In the 
absence of specific collective agreements, reference should be made to the 
minimum wage provisions specified in the national collective agreements 
for workers operating in the same sector and with the same employment 
grade as project workers.  
 
 
2.6. Self-employment 
 
The Monti-Fornero Reform narrows down the scope of application of 
self-employment in a considerable manner. This is due to the prevailing 
legal presumption that autonomous workers are hired on salaried 
employment contracts, to be applied in the cases provided by the law.  
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There are three criteria to establish whether an individual claiming to be 
self-employed is actually presumed to perform salaried employment on an 
open-ended contract. For the sake of clarity, it should be noted that the 
provision makes use of the wording “continuous and coordinated 
collaboration”. Nonetheless, pursuant to Italian labour law, a contractual 
arrangement of this kind lacking a specific project is reclassified as open-
ended salaried employment. For an individual to be regarded as a salaried 
employee on an open-ended contract, at least two out of three of the 
criteria listed below must be met.  
The criteria laid down by the law are factual situations pertinent to the 
running of the employment relationship which, besides its classification at 
a formal level, help determine the coordinating and continuing nature of 
the work performed. The criteria laid down by the Legislator are:  
1) the duration of the employment relationship, whereas lasting for more 
than eight months for two consecutive years; 
2) the provision of services to one client on an exclusive basis, provided 
that the turnover of the self-employed earned while operating for the 
same client – or for a permanent business establishment – over a period 
of two consecutive years amounts to 80% of his/her total earnings.  
3) the presence of a fixed workstation at the client’s premises, where 
“fixed” means that it is non-movable or temporary.  
The legal presumption of open-ended salaried employment does not apply 
in cases in which the tasks to be performed require high skill levels or 
“practical skills acquired through experience”. This is conditional on the 
fact that the average annual earnings of autonomous workers are equal to 
or higher than a certain sum statutorily determined. Another exception – 
which works as an alternative to the foregoing – concerns, for instance, a 
professional self-employed individual performing his/her job upon 
membership to professional association (special registers, professional 
bodies, and so forth). 
 
 
2.7. Special Forms of Joint Ventures 
 
The reform also makes provisions for special forms of joint ventures, 
whereby an associating party grants an associated party a share in the 
profits of his/her business or of one or more transactions on the basis of 
an agreed upon contribution. This is known in Italy as associazione in 
partecipazione (literally a sharing-profit agreement with contribution of 
labour). Over the years, an increase in the misuse of this contractual 
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scheme has been reported, particularly in clerical work or manual labour 
in the building industry. 
The Monti-Fornero Reform amends previous legislation governing this 
contractual arrangement, and specifies that it is possible to have up to a 
maximum of three associated parties engaged in the same activity if the 
contribution provided also includes work performance. This applies 
regardless of the number of associating parties, with the sole exception of 
an associated party being a spouse, a family member up to the third-
degree of kinship or a second-degree ascendant. In the event of non-
compliance with this clause, the associated parties who provide a 
contribution in the form of work performance will be considered as 
salaried employees on an open-ended contract. The legal presumption in 
favour of salaried employment thus does not allow for rebuttal evidence 
to demonstrate the genuine nature of the employment relationship.  
Prior to the enforcement of the reform, the setting-up of a number of 
joint ventures to deal with the same business or transaction did not 
impinge on the validity of the contract, save for cases in which at least one 
of them is established at a later stage (unlike otherwise agreed, the 
associating party cannot grant other individuals a share in the profits of a 
business or a transaction without the consent of the former associated 
parties).  
As already pointed out, the reform tightens up the regulation for this 
special form of joint venture. For the contract to be valid, it is possible to 
have up to a maximum of three associated parties engaged in the same 
activity, except in cases of family members or ascendants.  
The reform also sets down certain cases of legal presumptions of salaried 
employment, against which evidence can however be provided. A 
contractual arrangement concluded to set up a joint venture is presumed 
to be salaried employment in the following cases:  
- if the associated party does not have a share in the profits of the 
business run by the associating party; 
- in the event of failing to report the associated party on the activity 
carried out (by way of a report on the annual management if the activity 
has been performed for more than 12 months); 
- in the event that the agreed upon contribution on the part of the 
associated party corresponds to “unqualified” labour, that is neither 
characterized by theoretical knowledge acquired by specific training nor 
by practical skills acquired on the same job. 
In addition, in order to restrain the recourse to this form of joint venture, 
the reform sets forth an increase in the social contributions for the 
associated parties. In this sense, the cost of labour will rise at 1% every 
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year until 2018, totalling a contribution rate of 33% for those who are not 
covered by any other form of public retirement schemes.  
 
 
2.8. Occasional Work of an Accessory Nature  
 
The reform foresees a thorough review of regulations governing 
occasional work, that is work provided without concluding and 
employment contract and by means of a particular payment system, 
namely vouchers for an amount of 10 euro per hour.  
Already in 2003, the Biagi Law made provisions for workers on this 
contractual arrangements on the basis of remuneration. In this sense, the 
Biagi Law also detailed the category of workers who can engage in 
occasional work (young people, housewives, and retired people) as well as 
its scope of application (domestic and agricultural work, and light 
housework). 
Contrary to what was laid down in 2003, the Monti-Fornero Reform now 
specifies that occasional work only includes work performed on an 
occasional basis which generates a total income of €5,000 in a calendar 
year. Significantly, this sum corresponds to the sum earned from the 
services provided to all the client firms, marking an important difference 
with the past. Occasional workers can still carry out working activities up 
to a maximum of 2,000 Euros per annum to be paid by different client 
firms, provided that their services are rendered to entrepreneurs and 
professionals.  
Another relevant measure – which will certainly facilitate the recourse to 
ancillary work without any consequence in legal terms – is that the resort 
to this form of employment is allowed for all working activities and 
irrespective of the workers’ personal characteristics.  
Some special regulations have been laid down which scale back the 
recourse to occasional work in the agricultural sector to the following 
cases: 
- agricultural work of an occasional nature performed by retired people 
and by young people who are less than 25; 
- agricultural work provided to farmers which generates a turnover of 
7,000 Euros per annum, with the exception of farmers enrolled in special 
registers for the previous year.  
Public bodies are still allowed to make use of occasional work, as long as 
they comply with regulations to contain personnel costs and, whereas in 
force, budgetary stability pacts. In the same vein, recipients of social 
security benefits who are entitled to a maximum of 3,000 Euros for the 
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year 2013, can perform occasional work in both private and public bodies 
and in all productive sectors to supplement their monthly wage or any 
other form of social aid.  
 
 
3. Flexibility in Dismissals. Remedies for Unfair Dismissals and 
New Rules on Collective Dismissals 
 
In the Italian legal system, the termination of open-ended and salaried 
employment contracts can only take place for just cause – thus not 
allowing for the continuation of the employment relationship – or for 
justified reasons. If the latter, the employment contract can be 
discontinued because of a serious violation of the worker’s contractual 
obligations (that is for “subjective reasons”) or justified by needs related 
to production and its functioning, or organizational choices made by the 
employer (that is for objective reasons). In the event of unjustified 
dismissal, Italian legislation provides a set of remedial measures 
traditionally consisting in the worker’s reinstatement – in the event of 
large and medium-sized companies – or a compensation award – if 
concerning small-sized companies. 
Reinstatement takes place in cases of unfair dismissals, in businesses 
employing more than 15 employees in the productive unit where the 
unfair dismissal occurred – or more than 5 for employers who run a farm 
– or in businesses with more than 60 workers altogether, whether 
operating in the same productive unit or not. By virtue of this remedy the 
employment contract is not regarded as interrupted, thus the employee 
can ask to return to the same job and to demand unpaid salary. With 
regard to remedies in the form of compensation, it concerns the 
productive units and the employers not falling within the foregoing cases. 
It does not invalidate the effects of unfair dismissal, but places an 
obligation upon the employer to choose between re-hiring the workers 
and granting them a sum of money ranging from 2.5 and 6 months’ pay.  
By regarding as unfair the dismissal delivered without a reason, the reform 
amends the Italian remedial framework, seen as “anomalous” if compared 
to that of other countries, as producing discouraging effects on foreign 
investors in our country and penalising local employers at an international 
level. 
As a result, extant legislation now regulates unfair dismissals taking 
account of the underlying reasons and the employers’ liability. In this 
sense, there are different employment safeguards that apply in accordance 
with the reasons and depending of the type of dismissal, viz. 
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discriminatory dismissals, disciplinary dismissals and dismissals for 
justified objective reasons.  
 
 
3.1. Discriminatory Dismissals. Remedies including Reinstatement and Compensation 
 
Discriminatory dismissals take place when employees are removed from 
their position – irrespective of the employer’s will – on the grounds of 
religion, political, and personal belief, age, disability, gender, sexual 
orientation, race, language, and trade union affiliation. The reform does 
not make significant changes to the regulation of discriminatory 
dismissals. Regardless of the reasons provided and the number of workers 
employed, the ruling handed down by the employment tribunal making 
the dismissal of employees or executives null and void places an 
obligation upon the employer to re-hire the workers.  
This remedy now also includes dismissals nullified because in violation of 
the rule which prohibits one to discharge workers who are on maternity 
or parental leave or on the grounds of marriage. In addition, dismissals 
that are statutorily regarded as null and void are also considered 
discriminatory dismissals. By way of example, this includes workers who 
are removed from their position after being given training leave, or leave 
for particular circumstances. The same holds for dismissal resulting from 
illegal practice, such as the so-called “retaliatory” termination, that is 
illegal and arbitrary action taken against an employee who did not commit 
any misconduct.  
Workers are entitled to reinstatement also in the event of a dismissal that 
is null and void because notified orally and not in writing, regardless of 
the number of employees.  
As a result of the order of reinstatement ruled by the tribunal, the 
employee should return to work within 30 days from the employer’s 
communication. Alternatively, and without prejudice to the employee’s 
right to compensation for any loss suffered, the dismissed workers might 
ask for payment of up to 15 months’ pay, considering their last salary.  
The judge might also order the employer to pay compensation for the 
damage suffered from unfair loss of job, the amount of which is arrived at 
by calculating the last salary paid to the worker – e.g. to which he would 
have been entitled if not discharged – from the date of dismissal up to the 
date of effective reinstatement. The earnings resulting from working 
activities performed during the dismissal period should be deducted 
(aliunde perceptum). 
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Under any circumstances compensation for unfair dismissal can be less 
than 5 months’ pay, with the employer also obliged to pay social 
contributions and compulsory insurance for the entire period the worker 
has been away, including premiums for occupational injuries and diseases.  
It is also implied – the law remained silent on this point – that the 
employer is obligated to pay a fine for non-payment or delayed payment 
of social contributions.  
 
 
3.2. Dismissal for Disciplinary Reasons 
 
The reform also makes provisions for dismissals for disciplinary reasons, 
that is termination of employment due to a breach of contractual duties or 
serious violations on the part of the worker. These specifics are also 
grounds for dismissal for justified “subjective” reasons and just-cause 
dismissal, respectively. There are three remedies following a finding of 
unfair dismissals and they depend on the seriousness of the 
circumstances. 
The first case occurs when the employment tribunal ascertains that the 
dismissal is null and void for a lack of a justified “subjective” reason or 
just cause, because there is no case to answer, or because the violation 
falls within those for which measures short of dismissal can be imposed 
on the employee, in line with what is laid down by collective agreements 
or codes of conduct.  
In this case, the judge nullifies the unfair dismissal, ruling that the 
employer should reinstate the employee – or alternatively and on the 
employee’s request, pay a compensation award amounting to 15 months’ 
pay. The judge also specifies that the employment contract is terminated 
whereas the workers fail to return to work within 30 days from the 
employer’s communication, or they do not claim for compensation.  
It is also implied – the law kept silent on this point, too – that the 
employer is obligated to pay a fine for non-payment or delayed payment 
of social contributions.  
The employee is also entitled to the payment of compensation which is 
equal to remuneration accrued from the date of dismissal to the date of 
effective reinstatement - which cannot exceed 12 months’ pay – from 
which earnings resulting from working activities performed during the 
dismissal period should be deducted (aliunde perceptum), as well as potential 
wages earned if he had found a new occupation. The ruling that the 
dismissal is unfair also places an obligation upon the employer to pay 
social contributions and compulsory insurance for the period the worker 
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has been away, including premiums for occupational injuries and diseases. 
Distinct from what happens in the event of discriminatory dismissal, 
social contributions must include the interests legally accrued without 
taking into account sanctions for non-payment or a delay in the payment 
on the part of the employer. 
The second case concerns the event when the employer tribunal rules in 
favour of a lack of the justified “subjective” reasons or just cause put 
forward by the employer. Under these circumstances, the dismissal, if 
unjustified, is not regarded as null and void and the judge orders the 
termination of the employment contract from the date of dismissal. If this 
is the case, the worker is entitled to full compensation – in the sense that 
it also includes social security contributions – ranging from 12 to 24 
months’ pay considering the last salary, and some other criteria (length of 
service, number of employees, the size of the business – as well as the 
conduct and the conditions laid down by the parties, the latter requiring a 
written statement explaining the reasons for such conduct).  
The last case refers to the discriminatory dismissal that is null and void 
because of a violation of the requirement to provide justification or 
because of a procedural defect, which is typical of disciplinary dismissal. 
Under these circumstances, the dismissal is null and void and the 
employer is bound to pay full compensation – including social security 
contributions – ranging from 12 to 24 months’ pay considering the last 
salary, depending on the seriousness of the violation of the employer, with 
a duty to provide motivation in writing.  
 
 
3.3. Dismissal for Justified Objective Reasons  
 
The other case of dismissal is that taking place for justified objective 
reasons. In this respect, a review of extant legislation redesigned the 
remedial framework and introduced two new measures in procedural 
terms.  
The reform specifies that in notifying the worker of the dismissal, the 
employer must also provide the reasons causing the decision. This 
requirement marks a difference with the past, as previous legislation only 
specifies that such justification could be provided upon the ex-worker’s 
request within 15 days from being given notice. 
A further innovation concerns the discontinuation of the employment 
relationship for economic reasons. More specifically, the requirement to 
attempt conciliation has been introduced as a pre-requisite to further 
action to be taken with regard to the dismissal. This initiative, which is of 
ITALIAN LABOUR LAW AFTER THE SO-CALLED MONTI-FORNERO REFORM (LAW NO. 92/2012)  
 
71 
 @ 2012 ADAPT University Press 
an experimental nature, does not apply to small-sized enterprises as 
previously defined.  
The notification to be filed by the employer must specify the intention to 
terminate the employment contract for objective reasons, the justification 
for the dismissal and the measures to be taken to help the dismissed 
worker find alternative work. Once notification has been handed in, a 
special body appointed by the Ministry of Labour (Direzione Territoriale del 
lavoro – Provincial Labour Direction), summons the employer and the 
dismissed worker to a hearing before the local conciliation board within 7 
days from the delivery of the communication. If members of a union, 
both parties can appoint or mandate a union delegate, a lawyer or an 
employment consultant to represent them at the hearing, which can be 
postponed for a maximum of 15 days only in the event of a serious and 
certified impediment.  
The aim of conciliation is to find an alternative route to the termination of 
the employment contract. However, this procedure cannot last more than 
20 days from the date the parties were called on to meet, unless they agree 
to further discuss the issue until a settlement is achieved.  
Whereas the recourse to conciliation is not effective, or the Provincial 
Labour Direction fails to convene a meeting with the parties within 7 days 
of the delivery of the communication, the employer can dismiss the 
worker by giving notice. Conversely, if the attempt at conciliation is 
successful and the contract of employment comes to an end by mutual 
agreement, the law provides for the implementation of safety-net 
measures, as will be seen further on. It could also be the case that 
employment agencies are in charge of helping the worker re-enter the 
labour market.  
In order to encourage conciliation, it is also specified that in the event of a 
further appeal, the attitude of the parties will be taken into account – as 
resulting from the minutes of the hearing – as well as the proposal put 
forward by the local conciliation board to settle the issue. On the basis of 
these elements, the judge will rule in favour of the prevailing party to be 
awarded the court costs, and decide the amount of compensation 
resulting from the dismissal that is null and void as devoid of an economic 
or productive reason claimed by the employer.  
There are four circumstances which, in turn, give rise to four types of 
remedies. The forms of compensation laid down are thus related to the 
seriousness of the flaws at the time of terminating an employment 
contract.  
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3.3.1. Remedies including Reinstatement and Compensation  
 
This remedy concerns the situations in which the dismissal for objective 
reasons is unfair as justified on the grounds of physical or mental 
unfitness of the workers. This case also refers to an employment contract 
that is discontinued before expiration of the time granted to workers on 
sick or parental leave to maintain their post, or when the organizational 
and productive reasons claimed by employer are not grounded.  
In all these cases the dismissal is null and void and the employer is obliged 
to reinstate the dismissed worker, who is also entitled to a sum of money 
corresponding to a maximum of twelve months’ pay considering the last 
salary, deduced from what was earned from the workers when they were 
dismissed and what should hypothetically be paid to them if still in 
employment in that period, including social contributions and interests. In 
essence, remedies are the same as those laid down in the event of 
disciplinary dismissals that are held unfair.  
 
 
3.3.2. Reinstatement in the form of Compensation without Reintegration  
 
This remedy refers to all those cases not falling under the label of 
dismissal for justified objective reasons. Like the previous case, the reason 
justifying the dismissal is not grounded, or not in a patent manner. 
Accordingly, the dismissed worker is not entitled to reinstatement, but 
simply to a sum of money amounting to 12 to 24 months’ pay considering 
the last salary and arrived at by taking into account a number of factors 
(length of service, number of employees, size of the business, the attitude 
and the conditions set by the parties). The judge here acts as if they had to 
deal with unfair dismissal for just cause or justified objective reasons.  
 
 
3.3.3. Dismissals for Justified Objective Reasons. The Case of Discriminatory and 
Disciplinary Dismissals 
 
Another case is when the dismissed employee claims that the dismissal for 
justified objective reasons is the result of discrimination or unfair 
disciplinary action. If the employment tribunal find the complaint well 
founded, remedies for unfair discriminatory or disciplinary dismissals 
apply.  
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3.3.4. Dismissals for Justified Objective Reasons and Non-Compliance with Formal 
Requirements 
 
Dismissals for justified objective reasons must be initiated in accordance 
with certain formal requirements. Failing to provide justification for the 
dismissal or to comply with the obligation to seek conciliation will make 
the dismissal null and void. Being characterized by a procedural defect, 
they stand upon an equal footing with unfair dismissals resulting from 
disciplinary action. Accordingly, relevant legislation provides for 
termination of the employment contract, along with the supplying of an 
award amounting to six to twelve months’ pay to be granted to the 
dismissed workers, depending on the seriousness of the procedural defect.  
 
 
3.4. New Rules on Collective Dismissals  
 
Besides making amendments to existing rules on individual dismissals, the 
Legislator also put forward some new legislative measures concerning the 
regulation of collective redundancy. 
One aspect concerns the obligation to give early notice placed upon the 
employer who decides to dismiss employees for reasons of redundancy. 
The innovation lies in the opportunity to overcome the non-compliance 
of this requirement by signing an agreement concluded with trade unions 
during the redundancy procedures.  
Amendments have also been made to the obligation to communicate to 
relevant authorities or trade unions the list of workers made redundant or 
on mobility schemes. Information for each worker should include 
personal details, employment grade, as well as a detailed explanation of 
the criteria adopted to identify the workers to be made redundant. As for 
the time requirements, such communication should take place within 7 
days from – and no longer concurrently to – the notice of dismissal 
delivered to the employees. With regard to remedies in the event of 
collective dismissals that took place in breach of agreed procedures, they 
rest upon the seriousness of the breach, which might give raise to the 
inefficacy of collective dismissals (in the event of failing to notify in 
writing or to comply to statutorily procedures) – or make them void – in 
cases of violations of the eligibility criteria to dismiss the workers. 
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3.4.1. Remedies in the form of Compensation and Reinstatement  
 
In the event of collective dismissals not notified in writing, the worker is 
entitled to reinstatement and to a compensation award. The employment 
tribunal nullifies the dismissal and, concurrently, orders that the 
employees return to the same job, entitling them to a sum of money for 
the damage suffered. The amount of money to be paid is arrived at by 
calculating the wages and the social contributions from the date of the 
dismissal to the ruling of the courts – in any case not less than 5 months’ 
pay – which should be reduced by what has been earned by the employer 
whereas performing another working activity over the same period.  
 
 
3.4.2. Remedies in the form of Compensation without Reinstatement 
 
If collective dismissals have been found to be unfair because of a violation 
of collective agreements, the tribunal orders the discontinuation of the 
employment contract, that is effective from the date of the dismissal. It 
also entitles the employee to a sum of money amounting to 12 to 24 
months’ pay considering the last salary and arrived at by taking into 
account the worker’s length of service, the number of employees and the 
size of the business, the attitude and the conditions set by the parties, with 
an obligation to specify the reasons in this connection.  
  
 
3.4.3. Remedies including Reinstatement and Special Forms of Compensation  
 
In the event of non-compliance with the criteria laid down to identify the 
workers to be made redundant, the most comprehensive forms of remedy 
apply. In other words, the employment tribunal nullifies the unfair 
dismissal and the employer is obliged to reinstate the dismissed workers 
and to grant them a sum of money amounting to a maximum of twelve 
months’ pay considering the last salary from the date of dismissal to the 
date of reinstatement. The total sum should be reduced by the earnings 
resulting from other working activities performed by the workers while 
dismissed, as well as what was earned if they had been committed to 
seeking a new occupation. The employer is also under the obligation to 
pay social contributions for the same period, increased by the interests 
accrued until the date of reinstatement and without including penalties 
from non-payment or delayed payment of the amount due. This sum – yet 
lower than what entitled to the worker if not dismissed – is equal to the 
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difference between contributions accrued following the dismissal and 
those paid to the employer as a result of other working activities 
performed by the workers during the time they were dismissed. 
 
 
4. Undated Letter of Resignation and Termination by Mutual 
Consent 
 
The reform makes provision also with regard to the dismissal procedures. 
More specifically, special sanctions have been put in place for employers 
who ask workers to sign an undated letter of resignation and use them at a 
later stage, further dismissing the workers but claiming that they have 
resigned or freely terminated the employment contract. 
To combat this illegal practice, the law provides that resignation handed in 
by some categories of workers has to be validated by special bodies. This 
concerns women workers during pregnancy or workers who are fathers of 
children – by birth, custody, or national or international adoption – up to 
three years of age, thus extending the previous age limit of one year. 
Another innovation lies in the requirement to assess whether the 
resignation was really intended, which now applies to cases of voluntary 
resignation in a strict sense and to all cases of consensual termination 
other than those resulting from maternity or paternity.  
The genuine nature of both voluntary resignation and termination by 
mutual consent will be assessed through two distinct procedures, and their 
validity is thus conditional upon the outcome of this review process.  
Validation of resignation is not required in cases in which the 
discontinuation of the employment contract is the result of a reduction of 
staffing levels agreed upon by unions or relevant bodies, which are 
assumed to take all necessary steps to assess whether the workers 
consented to the discontinuation of the employment relationship. 
Procedures for validating workers’ resignation or termination of the 
employment contract can be carried out by the Provincial Labour 
Direction (Direzione Territoriale del lavoro), the local employment services, or 
by any other body listed in collective agreements and agreed upon by the 
most representative trade unions at a national level. 
Alternatively, the parties might issue a written statement to be appended 
to the notification of the termination of the employment relationship that 
has been sent to the employment services. Simplified criteria to ascertain 
the accuracy of the date and workers’ statement are to be detailed in a 
Ministerial Decree.  
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There are also certain obligations placed upon the employer in the event 
of non-compliance with the requirement of validation or the issuing of 
the foregoing statement. The employer has to send the worker a formal 
request to report to the evaluating bodies or produce a statement to be 
added to the notification sent to the employment services that the 
employment relationship has been brought to an end. This must be done 
within 30 days of the date of resignation or termination by mutual 
consent.  
Within seven days from the request and in the event of failing to satisfy 
these two conditions, the employment contract is dissolved in cases in 
which workers: 
 
- did not report to the Provincial Labour Direction or the local 
employment services in charge of ascertaining the voluntary nature of 
resignation;  
 
- did not produce the foregoing statement in writing; 
 
- did not revoke their resignation or intention to end the employment 
contract. 
 
The last aspect concerns the tightening up of the sanctioning mechanism 
and the devising of administrative fines – ranging from 5,000 to 30,000 
Euros – that apply in the event of employers making use of undated 
letters of resignation, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. It 
is the Provincial Labour Direction that has to determine the employers’ 
liability and the statutory amount to be paid.  
 
 
5. Reforming the System of Safety-Net Measures 
 
A key aspect of the Monti-Fornero Reform concerns the safeguards 
provided to workers in cases of loss of employment, as a means to strike a 
more effective balance between flexibility in hiring and flexibility in 
dismissals. Although the ambitious proposals originally put forward by the 
Minister of Labour, the reform does not impact on the system of safety-
net measures, which does not distance itself from the protection supplied 
to the worker in cases of partial or total unemployment.  
In the event of partial unemployment, that is suspension or reduction of 
the working time, workers might rely on certain forms of income support, 
with the reform that has widened their scope of application also by means 
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of the setting-up of bilateral funds, which might also include ad-hoc funds 
for lifelong learning for employees of small-sized companies not covered 
by income support schemes. This money is made available by sectoral 
employers’ associations and unions with the purpose of promoting 
workers’ further education, and is usually used to devise training schemes 
organized by the employers subsidising the fund. At present, income 
support measures only cover workers operating in the manufacturing 
sector, or those in some other industries with a certain number of 
employees. By way of example, in the commercial sector only businesses 
with more than 50 employees can apply to such funds. 
A wide-ranging reform was put forward in relation to the employment 
safeguards in case of total unemployment. In this connection, provisions 
have been introduced to supply protection to workers in a more 
thoughtful manner by means of Social Insurance for Employment 
(Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego, ASpI) – now regarded as the only form of 
income support in the event of loss of unemployment. The Social 
Insurance for Employment will be implemented in place of the 
unemployment benefits – granted to workers at the end of the 
employment contract, in cases of dismissal and special instances of 
resignation – and mobility allowances – income support provided to 
workers who have been made redundant or are registered as unemployed 
in special lists – previously supplied. Finally, the scope of application of 
traditional forms of income support measures has been widened, with the 
sole exception of those allocated to workers in the agricultural sector who 
are enrolled in special registers.  
In the event of total and involuntary unemployment, income support 
measures are envisioned through the Social Insurance for Employment 
starting from 1 January 2013 to all those eligible after that date. The 
eligibility criteria are similar to those laid down to access the 
unemployment benefits currently in place. Most notably, only workers 
who lose their occupation are entitled to these benefits, with inactive 
people or those who want to re-enter the labour market following a 
period of inactivity excluded from them.  
This aspect is noteworthy as it shows that this set of safety-net measures 
is not universal in scope, pointing out that long-overdue equality in the 
provision of welfare is not yet ensured. 
The system will be fully implemented starting from 2016, subsequent to a 
round of consultation between the Government and the social partners to 
assess its sustainability in relation to public expenditure and the transition 
period between the old and the new system. From 1 January 2014 and 
throughout the transitional phase, unemployment benefits will gradually 
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increase in duration, whereas redundancy schemes will decrease until their 
depletion, yet not later than 31 December 2016. 
In order to fund the Social Insurance for Employment, the reform 
imposes an obligation upon the employer to pay a certain amount of 
money in cases of termination of the employment relationship other than 
resignation (Article 2, par. 31 of Law No. 92/2012). Payment to the fund 
in the event of the foregoing conditions will take effect from 1 January 
2013 and the sum is arrived at by calculating 50% of the monthly 
unemployment benefits for each 12 months’ seniority over the last three 
years.  
Besides the Social Insurance for Employment, the reform also introduces 
another type of unemployment benefit, addressing those workers who 
meet only some of the social security requirements to fully enjoy these 
forms of income support, which is known as partial unemployment 
benefits (Mini ASpl). 
Similarly to the redundancy schemes previously in place for this category 
of workers, in order to be entitled to partial unemployment benefits, 
workers must have paid social contributions amounting to only 13 weeks 
(78 days) in the 12 months preceding redundancy. However, the 
difference lies in the fact one of the eligibility criteria – e.g. 2 years’ 
seniority – has been removed, fulfilling the goal of further widening the 
number of prospective recipients of the employment safeguards. Partial 
unemployment benefits are supplied for a time frame amounting to half 
the number of weeks for which contributions have been paid in the last 
year, deduced by previous benefits, if any. 
 
 
5.1. The Conditionality of the Unemployment Benefits 
 
With a view to help jobless people to adequately re-enter the labour 
market – most notably those who are in receipt of unemployment benefits 
– the Legislator has long since laid down a number of conditions that 
need to be satisfied in order to gain or maintain the status of unemployed, 
and thus being granted unemployment entitlements. These conditions 
mainly concern the attitude of recipients of benefits in relation to active 
labour policies – taking part in interviews, training, active job-search – or 
their status at the time of accepting an offer of work. In reality, this 
system has never been implemented, nor have there been any reported 
cases in which unemployment benefits have been suspended or 
terminated. 
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An attempt to make this conditionality more effective is that of raising the 
eligibility requirements. In this sense, recipients of unemployment benefits 
lose such entitlement if they perform a working activity resulting in annual 
earnings that are higher than the individual minimum income excluded 
from taxation. In a similar vein, the duration of contracts in salaried 
employment causing the termination of the unemployment benefits has 
been reduced to 6 to 8 months. Furthermore, unemployment benefits 
might be terminated on the grounds of a refusal to respond to an offer of 
work, either open-ended or fixed-term and irrespective of the duration of 
the employment contract. 
Along the same lines, with a view to encourage benefit recipients to 
actively seek work, help them to re-enter the labour market and make the 
conditions to supply income support more stringent, unemployment 
benefits – provided to both unemployed and inactive people – are 
terminated as a result of an unjustified refusal to take part in initiatives in 
the area of social policies or those promoted by relevant services. The 
same applies in cases of individuals occasionally taking part in such 
initiatives, or job-seekers who forgo job offers for which they are paid at 
least 20% of the gross amount of the benefit granted.  
If still in employment, the provision of unemployment benefits is 
terminated in the event of a refusal to attend training or retraining courses 
or even to taking part in them on an irregular basis without a justified 
reason. In this sense, only working activities, training and retraining 
courses carried out within 50 Km of the individual’s residence – or that 
can be reached in at most 80 minutes by means of public transport – 
pertain. 
 
 
5.2. Lump Sum Benefits for Workers in Quasi-Salaried Employment  
 
The government has committed to provide income support to workers in 
quasi-salaried employment (continuous and coordinated collaborators). 
This category of workers is regarded as distinct from autonomous 
workers – as they operate in absence of financial risks and without making 
use of site machinery and equipment – and salaried employees – for 
differences arising in terms of organisational autonomy, and no rights to 
exercise managerial and disciplinary power on the part of the user-
company. This move is intended to supply forms of income protection to 
all economically dependent workers, irrespective of the degree of 
autonomy or subordination.  
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Indeed, the Legislator of 2008 moved along the same lines – although on 
an experimental basis – envisioning a lump-sum allowance for workers on 
quasi-salaried employment who operate for one client in the event of a 
shortage of work.  
The reform programme is intended to safeguard this category of workers 
as they do not fall within the scope of application of Social Insurance for 
Employment, which only addresses salaried employees. Accordingly, 
starting from 2013, a lump-sum allowance will be granted to workers on 
quasi-salaried employment who have only operated for one employer in 
the previous year, provided that they pay contributions to the National 
Social Insurance Fund on an exclusive basis and in accordance to a special 
scheme (Gestione Separata).  
In order to be eligible, workers on quasi-salaried employment contracts 
must meet certain conditions in terms of income and contributions. The 
lump sum benefit amounts to 5% of the minimum taxable income paid 
for social security purposes, multiplied by the lowest remuneration 
received on a monthly basis in the previous year – at least four months’ 
pay – and remuneration not subject to contributions. The lump sum 
allowance is granted in a single payment whereas lower than 1,000 Euros, 
or in monthly rates amounting to 1000 Euros or less if lower than 1,000 
Euros.  
 
 
6. A Preliminary Assessment of the Reform. The Omnipotence of 
the Law, the Demise of Concertation, and the Debased Role of 
Collective Bargaining 
 
Reviewing the legal framework of the employment relationship has never 
been an easy task, in Italy more so than elsewhere. This is exhibited by the 
wave of terrorist attacks against drafters and practitioners who have 
engaged in the reform of labour law in our country. Accordingly, the 
efforts of those who undertake this task which is as complex as crucial for 
the Italian labour market should be acknowledged. All the more so as this 
is done in an awareness of the delicacy of the matter and the political, 
economic, and social implications that entail. Indeed, innovative and 
forward-looking ideas have never been lacking in Italy. As recalled by Prof 
Marco Biagi ten years ago – the last victim of terroristic attacks linked to 
labour issues – there is a need to move beyond ideological blinkers and 
social tensions that prevent the devising of reforms necessary to keep up 
with the changes currently underway. His teachings are still relevant today, 
and the passing of Law No. 92 of 2012 on the part of the Monti’s 
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Government demonstrates for the first time that it is possible to 
overcome legal constraints and limitations that for long have penalized 
Italy in the international and comparative context. On close examination, 
this is the most relevant aspect the Government and Elsa Fornero – the 
tenacious Minister of Labour – should be credited for this.  
Nevertheless, the reform came under heavy criticism for a number of 
reasons, even prior to the amendments made by the Government and the 
Parliament approval. This might be ascribed also to the fact that Italy is 
lacking of an ex ante evaluation system that foresees the economic and 
social impact of newly-issued provisions. This state of affairs of course 
acts as a hindrance to the reform process and gives rise to a number of 
objections devoid of solid grounds. 
Indubitably, the reform drafted by the technocrats currently in office does 
not appeal to labour lawyers nor to operators in the labour market. The 
few proponents of the reform programme are mainly experts in the field 
who perform a dual role – they are both academics and members of the 
Parliament – and contributed to issue and approve the reform.  
Employers’ associations and trade unions are likewise discontent, albeit 
for opposite reasons. From where the employers stand, the narrowing 
down in the use of atypical and fixed-term contracts is unacceptable, 
especially for small-sized enterprises which, unlike large and medium-sized 
companies, did not benefit from provisions concerning flexibility in 
dismissals15.  
Trade unions for their part oppose the deregulation of provisions on 
dismissals for economic reasons in open-ended employment. The remedy 
of reinstatement in the event of unfair dismissal, (rightly or wrongly) 
perceived as peculiar to Italy within the international context, has been 
limited only to certain cases (see par. 3.4.3.). As for compensation, it has 
been extended also to large-sized enterprises, yet the relevant procedures 
remain unclear. 
Trade unions leaders, yet this view is also shared by most academics, 
signal that the shift from property rule to liability rule with regard to 
dismissals will undermine the position of workers who, primarily during 
an economic crisis, will be forced to take jobs with low levels of 
protection and remuneration.  
Academics also maintain that the reform is inadequate in technical terms 
and much groundwork is needed. Nevertheless, there is a need to avoid 
the tendency, which is peculiar to Italy, to reject any attempt to change a 
                                                 
15 Supra, note 7. 
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priori, that is without carefully entering into the merits of the proposals 
that are put forward. Arguing against the mechanics and the underlying 
principles of a proposal – as is the case of the Italian reform – is often 
done in support of ideologies and lines of thought arguing in favour of 
the relationship between capital and labour.  
Indeed, the Treu and the Biagi Reforms16 have shown that substantial 
pieces of legislation can be appreciated only after a relatively long time 
frame, that is after an implementation period and an harmonisation 
process with the extant legal framework17. As a result, Mr Monti is 
absolutely right in telling the Wall Street Journal that the reform deserves “a 
serious analysis rather than snap judgments”18. 
However, the lack of an adequate evaluation system in Italy that helps to 
predict the impact of the provisions put in place questions the unfaltering 
assertion made by the Italian Prime Minister and reported by the same 
newspaper, according to which the reform “will have a major and positive 
impact on the Italian economy”. 
The major problem of the Italian labour market is not the (vast) amount 
of provisions enacted nor their technical content, but their full 
implementation and effectiveness.  
Past experience clearly indicates that many legislative measures remain 
only on paper. This is the case of a number of proposals envisioned in the 
reform of the labour market of 2003 (the Biagi Reform), among others 
the national employment information service, the access-to-work 
contracts addressing women living in the South of Italy, the 
apprenticeship contracts providing an alternation between school and 
work and modelled after the German system, forms of cooperation 
between public and private operators, the accreditation system of 
employment agencies, the suspension of the unemployment benefit for 
those who refuse training or an adequate offer of work underpinning an 
innovative system of safety-net measures. 
These institutions have gained momentum, or have been amended by the 
newly-issued reform, yet they are bound to remain unenforced without 
                                                 
16 See M. Tiraboschi, The Italian Labour Market after the Biagi Reform, The International Journal 
of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 21, No. 2, 2005, 149-192. 
17 In a similar vein, see M. Tiraboschi, The Reform of the Italian Labor Market over the Past 
Ten Years: a Process of Liberalization?, Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 29 No. 4, 
2008, 427-458. 
18 M. Monti, Italy’s Labor Reforms Are Serious and Will Be Effective, in The Wall Street Journal, 
April 7, 2012, A14. See also in Adapt International Bulletin, No. 14, 2012, in 
www.adaptbulletin.eu, (Last accessed 13 October 2012). 
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the involvement of social and political parties, operators of the labour 
market and actors of industrial relations. 
Accordingly, if one considers the two principles underpinning the reform 
– higher flexibility in dismissals and lower flexibility in hiring – the 
amendments made to the contractual arrangements appear to be 
inappropriate (supra par. 2). Paradoxically, unfulfilled promises of stable 
employment and the limitations placed upon project and temporary work 
come to penalise not only compliant employers, but also precarious 
workers who are not offered stable occupations at the end of the 36-
month period until which fixed-term contracts can be extended. This 
aspect contributes to raise the rate of undeclared work, which is another 
major problem of the Italian labour market which, in turn, might bring 
about a tightening up of the sanctioning system, as well as an increase in 
the cost of labour and bureaucracy. This state of play will jeopardise the 
successful effort made in the last twenty years with the Biagi and Treu 
Reforms to regulate jobs performed in the hidden economy, restoring the 
recourse to undeclared work, and encouraging precarious employment 
and processes of delocalisation.  
Neither telling are the arguments put forward to modify Article 18 of the 
Workers’ Statute (Law No. 300/1970), a cornerstone of Italian labour law. 
According to this provision, employers with less than 15 employees are 
under the obligation to reinstate workers who are found to be unfairly 
dismissed. The issue has attracted wide media coverage at both national 
and international level but produced a result that goes in the opposite 
direction to that expected by those who argued in favour of its repeal or a 
narrowing down of its scope of application. Once again, it would have 
been sufficient to refer to the teachings of Marco Biagi, who always 
argued for the need to resort to common sense in envisaging 
interventions that would not affect the modernisation of the labour 
market or jeopardize the dialogue between law-makers and social partners. 
He used to say “Why didn’t I make reference to Article No. 18? The 
reason is quite simple. The White Paper made a passing reference to 
Article 18, but it was not regarded as a key aspect, even though it shows a 
bias towards its amendments. I think that re-instatement is no longer 
applicable. It is just a sort of symbol, a deterrent measure with no power 
of discouraging dismissals. Indeed, its deterrent nature lies in the fact that 
it promotes fraudulent practices. Worldwide, unfairly dismissed workers 
are entitled to compensation. This is done under civil law, pursuant to 
which the only way to deal with the damage suffered by workers is to 
grant them the payment of a compensation award – regardless of the 
amount and the waiting time. Notwithstanding its marginal role, one 
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might ask why we still discuss Article 18. Actually, I do not think that this 
topic should be discussed. We had better focus on some other, and far 
more relevant, issues”19. The struggle over Article 18 of the Workers’ 
Statute allowed the Government to repeatedly (and naively?) assert the 
effectiveness of the reform, on the assumption that, if the reform is 
criticized by everyone, it means that a balance has been stricken between 
different interests. This is the position of the Minister of Labour Elsa 
Fornero prior to the passing of the reform, while from the Wall Street 
Journal a rather confident Prime Minister Mario Monti maintained that 
“the fact that it has been attacked by both the main employers association 
and the metalworkers union, part of the leading trade union 
confederation, indicates that we have got the balance right”. In the 
author’s view, this is the heart of the problem. The idea that a reform is 
balanced because it makes everyone unhappy is paradoxical.  
The assumption that changes to the existing legal framework are necessary 
to keep up with “new needs arising from a different context” – as 
reported in the report accompanying the legislative text – was not 
followed up with a careful reading of the new conditions, leading the 
reform to promote once again the same pattern of open-ended 
employment relationships which characterized Taylorism and Fordism 
over the last century20. 
The peripheral role allocated to the consultation process with social 
partners on the part of the Government led some to talk of the demise of 
concertation. However, there is more than meets the eye. Aside from the 
marginal role carried out by employers’ associations, and above all trade 
unions, in devising the reform, it is beyond dispute that mandatory 
provisions play a major role whereas limited room to manoeuvre is left to 
collective bargaining and social partners.  
Accordingly, rather than the method of concertation, it is the principle of 
subsidiarity and the role of decentralized collective bargaining that are 
penalised the most, along with the trust placed in an autonomous model 
of industrial relations and a bilateral approach, so far the privileged 
channel for the regulation of the labour market. 
                                                 
19 M. Biagi, Non fissiamoci sul 18, intervention made to CNEL, November 2001, in 
L’Espresso del 18 April 2002, p 56.  
20 Some critical remarks on the central role of open-ended salaried employment in 
relation to the transposition of the 1999 Directive on fixed-term work, of a more general 
nature, can be found in M. Tiraboschi, Glancing at the Past: an Agreement for the Markets of 
XXI Century, The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 15, 
No. 2, 1999, 105-120. 
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The truth is that the Monti-Fornero Reform is not poorly made or 
technically inadequate, as maintained by some labour law scholars, but 
simply conceptually wrong because it draws on the assumption that it is 
possible to deal with diversified production and work processes by way of 
a single (or prevailing) and open-ended employment relationship, which 
for Mr. Monti himself no longer exists and is labelled as “boring”.  
In practical terms, this will act as a hindrance to the recourse of quasi-
salaried employment (coordinated and continuative work) or autonomous 
work. In addition, temporary work is limited to exceptional cases and to 
temporary needs, and incentives for access-to-work contracts for 
disadvantaged workers will be repealed. Further, the use of part-time work 
and other forms of employment relationships (including the use of the 
voucher system and on-call work) will also be limited, although over the 
years, they contributed to legalize undeclared work. 
On reflection, however, the ongoing change of the economic context 
provides for a major overhaul of flexible, quasi-salaried, and temporary 
employment only on the condition that flexibility in dismissals is 
increased, and if accompanied by a review of the safety-net measures.  
A half-way solution, as the one put forward in the reform would end up 
penalizing employers, but above all workers. Younger workers and those 
currently forced out of the labour market will bear the brunt of the reform 
and, accordingly, they will no longer be pushed towards precarious 
employment but rather towards illegal and undeclared work. 
For the most part, workers feel more insecure and precarious than in the 
past. Employers believe that the regulatory framework is unsuitable to 
face the challenges posed by globalisation and new markets.  
There is profound dissatisfaction with a very complex body of law, that 
does not provide workers with the necessary protection, hampering the 
dynamism of production processes and labour organization. Against this 
background, it would be foolish to push for a radical reform of the labour 
market that will probably just remain on paper. 
Overindulging in reforms is certainly a lesser evil than partisanship and 
ideological blinkers that marked the last ten years in Italy, yet at the end of 
the day it is perhaps just as damaging and counterproductive. 
Today workers and businesses need a very simple regulatory framework, 
with effective rather than formal rules, to be complied with by everyone 
as contributing to foster mutual trust and active collaboration at the 
workplaces. A competitive economy must rely on highly-motivated 
workers that give their best, invest in their skills and adaptability, rather 
than on a overly-rigid protection system. This is what stability of 
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employment really means, a kind of stability based on mutual advantage 
rather than on norms that are statutorily imposed.  
The fact that the reform of the labour market leaves everyone unsatisfied 
should not be regarded as a positive feedback, rather as a serious 
weakness of a provision imposed by the Government which reduces the 
role of the social partners and moves away from an autonomous system 
of industrial relations to regulate employment relationships at all levels.  
The attempt to strike a balance between flexibility and security caused this 
reform to be incomplete, a half-way reform that oscillates between a 
dangerous past and a future that is still to be planned.  
The risk that “growth” would only be a word in the title of the legislative 
text is thus far from being unlikely. 
